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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880269-CA 
v. : 
ALLEN DWAINE OLSEN, MICHAEL : 
PAYNE WARNICK and DONALD RAY 
HATCH, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants were convicted of theft under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-404, a third degree felony, on January 22, 1988, and 
sentenced on March 16, 1988. Their notice of appeal was filed in 
district court on April 13, 1988 (T. 184). Under Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3, an under Utah Court of Appeals Rule 4(a), jurisdiction 
is proper in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendants of 
theft? 
II. Did the prosecution prejudice the trial of 
defendants by failing to "disclose" oral statements made by the 
defendants, in violation of the rules of discovery, and if so, 
did defendants respond to this violation in a manner that 
preserved their objection? 
III. Did defendants preserve for appeal their argument 
that the prosecution's rebuttal witness should not have been 
allowed to testify because the prosecution had not listed her as 
a prospective witness, and if so, did the trial court abuse its 
discretion, and thereby commit prejudicial error in allowing the 
witness to testify? 
IV. Did the court err in giving the jury instruction on 
transporting cattle without proof of ownership? 
V. Did the prosecutor conduct himself improperly, and 
thereby prejudice the trial of defendants, in quoting during 
opening arguments an oral statement of one of the defendants, 
which statement was not admitted at trial, and if so, did 
defendants preserve this argument for appeal? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Controlling constitutional and statutory provisions are 
provided in full, as they appear in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged by information signed on 
September 6, 1987, with theft, a third degree felony violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404. The information alleged that "on or 
about the 29th day of August, 1987, [defendants did] obtain and 
exercise unauthorized control over seven (7) head of cattle owned 
by A. C. EKker at Robber's Roost in Wayne County, Utah, a Third 
Degree Felony." (R. 1). Preliminary hearing was held on 
September 8, 1987, at which time the information was read, and 
all defendants waived their right to an arraignment and pleaded 
not guilty, and were bound over to district court (R. 9, 38). 
Jury trial was held on January 21 and 22, 1988. On 
January 22, 1988, defendants were convicted of violating Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-404, the theft statute (R. 167). On March 16, 
1988, each defendant was sentenced to serve one to five years in 
prison (R. 182). That sentence was suspended, and defendants 
were ordered to serve one year in the Wayne County Jail, and to 
serve eighteen months' probation after the year in jail (R. 182). 
They were also fined $5,000 and ordered to pay a 25% victim 
reparation fee and restitution (R. 174). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wayne County Sheriff, Kerry Bruce Ekker, testified that 
on August 29, 1987, he received a message-which influenced him to 
drive to the Robber's Roost, Hans Flat area of Wayne County (T. 
33-34). He checked for vehicle tracks, and found tracks of a 
"six-foot axle, pulling an eight-foot axle trailer" heading north 
toward the Spur area, and suspected that those tracks were made 
by the "vehicle [he] was looking for" (T. 34-35). He waited for 
four hours for the vehicle to return through the necessary 
passageway out of the area, which was near the unmanned ranger 
station (T. 35). After the defendants pulling a trailer full of 
cattle came into his sight, Sheriff Ekker stopped the defendants 
(T. 36). 
When Sheriff Ekker asked the driver of the truck whose 
cattle they were hauling, the driver of the truck, Mr. Hatch, 
responded, "I don't know." (T. 36-37). After contesting that 
response from Mr. Hatch, the sheriff placed defendants under 
arrest for theft and read them their rights (T. 37). After the 
defendants indicated that they understood their rights (T. 39), a 
Mr. Hunt drove defendants' truck and trailer, and the defendants 
were transported to jail (T. 40). Defendant Warwick rode with 
Sheriff Ekker, and defendants Hatch and Olsen were transported by 
Deputy Brinkerhoff (T. 41). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence and conclusions to be inferred therefrom 
in this case support defendants' convictions. 
During the trial, defendants waived any objection to 
the prosecution's alleged failure to disclose oral statements of 
defendants. Because defendants never requested disclosure of 
oral statements, and knew that the prosecution did not view their 
discovery request as inclusive of oral statements, they are in no 
position to claim that the rules of discovery were violated by 
the prosecution in this case. 
During the trial, defendants also waived their 
opportunity to pursue on appeal their objection to the testimony 
of Mrs. Hatch. The prosecution was under no duty to disclose the 
name of the rebuttal witness. Particularly in view of the 
evidence of defendants' commission of the crime for which they 
were convicted, defendants cannot claim that the trial court's 
decision to allow the rebuttal witness to testify constituted 
prejudicial error. 
Because defendants' jurors, operating under the "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" standard, convicted defendants 
of theft, this Court need not review the lesser included offense 
instruction drafted by defendants. Mootness of the question 
aside, the trial court's decision to inform the jurors of the law 
on transporting cattle without proof of ownership was appropriate 
in the context of this case and the other instructions that were 
given. 
Defendants waived their argument for prosecutorial 
misconduct at trial, and the statement the prosecutor quoted 
during his opening argument properly could have been presented to 
the jury, the prosecutor's conduct during the opening argument 
was appropriate, 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT. 
The information with which defendants were charged 
with theft alleged that "on or about the 29th of August, 1987, 
[defendants did] obtain and exercise unauthorized control over 
seven (7) head of cattle owned by A. C. Ekker at Robber's Roost 
in Wayne County, Utah with intention to deprive the owner 
thereof." (R. 139). 
On appeal, defendants challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented at trial demonstrating their intent to deprive 
A. C. Ekker of the cattle, claiming that the evidence shows that 
defendants didn't know they were taking anyone's property, but 
believed that they were adopting wild cows (Appellants' brief 17-
22). 
The standard of review of a claim of insufficiency of 
evidence is set forth in State v. Walker, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 
(Utah 1988): 
On appeal, it is the defendant's burden to 
establish that the evidence at trial was so 
inconclusive or insubstantial as to preclude the jury 
from properly finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). In 
reviewing the conviction, we do not substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury. "So long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from 
which findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
Ld. at 30. 
All three defendants relied on the testimony of 
defendant Hatch (T. 185) to present to the jury their argument 
that they thought the cattle they took were wild, and there for 
the taking. Viewing his testimony, in combination with the 
testimony of other witnesses, this Court should conclude that the 
jurors in this case could have, acting within reason, found 
defendants guilty of theft beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant Hatch, himself an owner of over fifty head of 
cattle running on a government allotment, a man who had been 
around the cattle business for twenty-eight years, a man who had 
unbranded calves of his own (T. 154), and a man who admitted at 
trial that if cattle are on private property or other private 
arrangement, as opposed to the open range, they need not be 
branded (T. 173), told the jurors in this case that he and the 
other defendants drove over a cattle guard and past a sign saying 
"A. C. Ekker Ranch 7 miles" (T. 162) to catch some wild cows. 
The cattle taken were Texas longhorns, unique in color, 
size, and in their horns from other cattle raised in the area (R. 
30, 77-78), the first of which was imported to the Ekker 
allotment in 1978 (T. 100). In the words of defendant Hatch, 
wThey were small ratty looking cattle, them bred cattle I guess 
you'd call them what I hear." (T. 160). Indeed, defendant Hatch 
not only had heard about the longhorns, but had researched them 
and expressed an interest in owning some before the thefts 
occurred (T. 188-189). 
Defendant Hatch testified if defendants had seen one 
branded cow in proximity to those that defendants took, they 
wouldn't have taken any, because one branded cow was sufficient 
proof of ownership of the unbranded cattle accompanying branded 
ones (T. 166, 179, 181). Indeed, so diligent were defendants in 
insuring that they saw and took no cattle bearing marks of 
domestication, that they checked for injection scars inside the 
ears of every cow that they saw (even the ones they didn't 
take)(T. 163, 169). 
At the time of arrest, defendants' trailer contained 
unusual roping equipment (T. 58), two calves, a two-year-old 
longhorn hereford cross bull, a two-year old heifer, a yearling 
heifer, a year-old bull, and a four-year-old cow (R. 52-56). 
Two of the animals were four months old, were not weaned, and 
were not with their mothers (T. 57). Sheriff Ekker testified 
that they had been taken from their mothers on the day of the 
theft (T. 78). Mr. Hatch testified that defendants took the 
cattle home "and rope at them a little bit and maybe put some 
weight on them and dress 'em out." (T. 172). 
Mr. A. C. Ekker explained how defendant's choice to 
take the two unweaned calves indicated that the calves were in 
the presence of branded cattle: 
A That isn't correct because if you had a choice 
and you were taking a critter to market or if you were 
taking a critter for your own use, you would not choose 
a calf. You would choose a critter that was old enough 
to be a mother. A calf, you have to keep her until 
she's three before she has her first baby. How much 
production is that? If her mother was unbranded and 
you knew she had a calf on her, she's gonna have a calf 
next year, I'd take the mother; wouldn't you, 
Q Well I guess that would depend on how hard it 
was to catch the mother. 
A They had mothers and bulls the same size as the 
mothers to the calves in the trailer. So apparently 
they could accomplish that. 
(T. 127). Mr. Hatch testified that the mothers of the calves 
bore no brands, and that the reason that he didn't take one of 
the two mother cows was that she was too far from the trailer to 
drag in (T. 166). He provided no explanation for his choice of 
the other calf over the other mother cow. 
A. C. Ekker, the owner of the allotment on which the 
cattle were taken, testified that in isolated areas, five percent 
of the animals rounded up are unbranded (T. 103). Mr. Stanley 
Adams of the Bureau of Land Management testified that on each of 
his trips through the A. C. Ekker allotment, he saw at least one 
branded head of cattle (T. 151-152). Mr. A. C. Ekker and three 
other cowboys were in the area where the thefts occurred during 
November and December of 1987, the year of the thefts, gathering 
cattle (T. 195-96). They corralled fourteen head of cattle in 
one day, and found none that were unbranded except for unweaned 
calves (T. 196). Two days after the thefts, Mr. A. C. Ekker was 
in the area of the thefts and he saw some branded cattle (T. 
197). 
Throughout the opening statement of defendants, the 
testimony of defendant Hatch, and defendants' appellate brief, 
defendants have steadfastly maintained that they took the cattle 
from the Ekker allotment with the sincere belief that the cattle 
were there, waiting to be claimed by the first person able to 
catch them. Yet when defendants were arrested with the cattle in 
their trailer, and Sheriff Ekker asked them, "Whose cattle are 
those?", defendant Hatch replied "I don't know." (T. 36-37). 
Defendants' jurors, given the opportunity to hear this 
evidence, and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, 
surely would have been acting within reason in concludin6g that 
defendants had the intent to steal the cattle, and were guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of theft. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULES OF 
DISCOVERY IN "FAILING TO DISCLOSE" 
DEFENDANTS' ORAL STATEMENTS, AND DEFENDANTS 
HAVE NOT PRESERVED THIS ARGUMENT FOR APPEAL. 
During the opening statement of the Wayne County 
prosecutor, Tex Olsen, he quoted an oral statement made by 
defendant Warwick at the time of arrest, "We are not going 
through all that rigmarole [trial process].... I'm guilty and I 
know it." (T. 15). This quotation drew an objection from defense 
counsel, who claimed at the subsequent bench conference that the 
oral statements of the defendants should be excluded from 
evidence, because the prosecution had failed to produce them in 
response to defendants' discovery requests (T. 15). 
A. Defendants Waived Their Right To Raise Their 
Allegation That The Prosecution Violated The Rules 
Of Discovery In Failing To Disclose Defendants' 
Oral Statements. 
The remedies for defendants claiming prosecutorial 
violation of the rules of criminal discovery are provided in Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-35-16(g), which reads as follows: 
If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court 
that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or 
inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
The only relief requested by defendants in the instant 
case was exclusion of evidence, which the trial court granted. 
The fact that the defendants wanted no relief other than the 
exclusion of the statements and were willing to proceed with the 
trial after the jurors heard the prosecutor quote the only oral 
statement of any defendant that was quoted during the trial, is 
exemplified by their failure to request a continuance or a 
mistrial. Following the trial court's ruling excluding the oral 
statements of defendants, and in response to the State's motion 
for a mistrial, defense counsel responded, "Your Honor, let me 
indicate in response to the motion, we do oppose the motion. Our 
clients are here for their day in Court." (T. 92). Mr. Means did 
not dispute this statement. During the entire trial, none of the 
defendants ever requested any relief other than suppression of 
the evidence; the trial court's indication that the oral 
statements of defendants might be admissible if the defendants 
testified raised no argument from the defendants (T. 93). 
In State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988), the 
defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery and 
two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the defendant 
raised an objection to the prosecution's compliance with a 
discovery order, noting that although the defense had obtained a 
court order for the prosecution to disclose all statements made 
by the defendant, the prosecution had failed to disclose a 
statement made by the defendant to his arresting officer until 
shortly before trial. When the prosecution offered this evidence 
of defendant's statement during rebuttal, defendant objected 
unsuccessfully, and subsequently moved for a mistrial. The 
supreme court, in rejecting this claim of discovery violation, 
explained how a defendant's conduct upon discovering the 
previously undisclosed evidence may dispose of any objection to 
the prosecution's conduct during discovery: 
A pivotal fact in our reversal of Knight was 
defense counsel's timely efforts to obtain relief in 
order to mitigate the potential or suffered prejudice 
caused by the prosecutor's wrongful conduct. Such was 
not the case at defendant's trial. Despite being 
informed of defendant's statements prior to trial and 
having reasonable knowledge that such statements might 
be used by the prosecution, defense counsel did not 
move for a continuance, to which he would have been 
entitled. Thus, under the facts of this case, we 
conclude that defendant waived relief under rule 16(g) 
as implemented in Knight by not making timely efforts 
to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice accused by the 
prosecutor's conduct. 
Id. at 882-883 (footnotes omitted). 
Comparison of the instant case with numerous others 
demonstrates that defendants' failure to mitigate the impact of 
the evidence that they claim surprised them at trial precludes 
arguments of reversible error on appeal. Compare State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919, n. 6 (Utah 1987)(noting prior Utah 
cases in which defendants failures to seek adequate rule 16(g) 
remedies constituted waiver of discovery violation claim); State 
v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275-276 (Utah 1985)(defendant's claim 
of violation of discovery, based on prosecution's failure to 
produce notes from interview with prosecution witness, was 
minimized by the fact that defendant did not demand to see the 
notes at trial when he became aware of them); State v. Harris, 
14 Wash.App. 414, 542 P.2d 122, 126 (1975)(remedy for defendant, 
surprised by rebuttal witness testimony, is request for 
continuance). 
This Court should not allow defendants to resurrect on 
appeal their argument of discovery violation, which they so 
clearly laid to rest at trial. 
B. Defendants Did Not Request Production Of 
Their Oral Statements. 
Defendants Warnick and Olsen submitted a request for 
discovery seeking 
1. Relevant written or recorded statements] of 
Defendants, Allen Dwaine Olsen or Michael Payne Warwick 
or their co-defendant Donald Ray Hatch[.] 
(R. 11). Defendant Hatch's initial discovery request, dated 
September 29, 1987, also requested H[a]ny written or recorded 
statements of the defendant or any co-defendants." (R. 25). The 
statements now at issue were oral statements, which were never 
written or recorded (R. 42-43). None of the discovery requests 
submitted by defendants requested oral statements. 
During the arguments to the trial court, defense 
counsel stated, 
The reason that that is worded such in our demand for 
discovery is that's taken right from the statutory 
language under rule, if I'm not mistaken. I think the 
implication of that rule is that in asking for a 
statement of your client, you're not limiting the 
request to something that someone might have written 
down, necessarily, but it's standard procedure that it 
is written down. 
(T. 47). The rule to which defense counsel referred to, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-16, states in part, 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or co-defendants[.] 
(empha sis added). 
This Court should not condone defendants' broad 
definition of the phrase "written or recorded statements". The 
Knight court emphasized that "the discovery request must be 
sufficiently specific to permit the prosecution to understand 
what is sought and to justify the parallel assumption on the 
part of the defense that material not produced does not exist." 
id. at 917. 
Not only would the adoption of defendants' broad 
definition of "written or recorded statements" undermine Knight's 
edict for specific drafting of discovery requests, but also, it 
would impose upon the prosecution and all related investigative 
agencies the burden of memorializing all potential witness 
statements. Without memorializing all potential witness 
statements, the prosecution and investigative agencies could not 
comply with the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(a)(1) 
placed before this Court by defendants. Such expansive 
interpretation is not appropriate under general rules of 
statutory construction, or under Utah law. As stated by Judge 
Garff in his dissenting opinion in State v. Wight, 97 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1988), 
Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, 
the statute must be held to mean what its language 
plainly expresses. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction section 46.01 (4th Ed. 1984). In 
construing such a statute, we must, therefore, give 
effect to Congress's underlying intent by assuming that 
each term in the statute was used advisedly, Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 672 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), giving the words their ordinary, 
plain meaning unless there is something in the total 
context of the legislation which would justify a 
different meaning. 
Id. at 33. 
Numerous courts have rejected arguments, similar to 
those of defendants in this case, for broad and unusual 
interpretations of the language in various discovery statutes. 
See State v. Escherivel, 113 Ariz. 330, 552 P.2d 1194, 1195 
(1976)(defendants' oral statements to arresting officer were not 
discoverable pursuant to statute defining discoverable statements 
of defendants, which included recorded statements, written 
verbatim and written summaries of oral statements, and written, 
signed statements, and motion for mistrial based on violation of 
discovery rules was properly denied.); State v. Cripps, 177 Mont. 
410, 582 P.2d 312, 317 (1978)(discovery request for written and 
recorded statements did not entitle defendant to oral statement 
of witness); Watts v. State, 487 P.2d 981, 986 (Okl.Cr. 
1971)(defendant's request for "The following papers, to-wit: any 
and all statements made by defendant herein" did not entitle him 
to production of his oral statements, which the court found he 
did not request), modified on other grounds, 507 P.2d 915 
(Okl.Cr. 1973); People v. Garcia, 627 P.2d 255, 258-259 (Colo. 
App. 1980)(prosecutor, under court order to provide defendant 
with relevant "written or recorded statements or summaries of 
statements" was not obligated to reduce witness's oral statement 
to writing and provide it to defendant); State v. McKendall# 36 
Or.App.187, 584 P.2d 316, 321-322 (1978)(discovery statute 
providing disclosure of "memoranda of any oral statements" did 
not require state to memorialize and disclose oral statements); 
State v. Bright, 229 Kan. 185, 623 P.2d 917, 919-920 
(1981)(readout of gas chromotograph spectophotometer was not a 
"statement" discoverable under the rules of discovery); State v. 
Haynes, 49 Or.App 89, 619 P.2d 889, 894-895 (1980)(detective's 
chart used during witness interview to refresh the witness's 
memory of the crime, which chart bore paraphrases of the 
witness's comments, was not discoverable as a statement of a 
witness); Wright v. State, 501 P.2d 1360, 1370-1371 (Alaska 
1972)(district attorney's notes from witness interview did not 
constitute statement discoverable under state Jencks Act); State 
v. Smallwoodf 223 Kan. 320, 574 P.2d 1361, 1364-1365 
(1978)(attorney's notes of witness interview, which had not been 
read back to and adopted by witness were not discoverable under 
state Jencks Act); State v. Gardner, 5 Or.App. 493, 484 P.2d 851, 
852 (1971)(under state Jencks act, attorney's interview notes 
were not discoverable as statement of witness); State v. Hinton, 
680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984)(discovery statute providing 
disclosure of statements of co-defendants did not mandate 
discovery statements of co-conspirator, who was tried separately 
from defendant). 
Defendants' objection to the prosecution's failure to 
"disclose" the oral statements of defendants in response to their 
discovery request for "written or recorded" statements is without 
merit. 
C. There Was No Knight Violation In This Case, 
And Had There Been, It Would Have Been Harmless. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states 
in part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or co-defendants; 
.... 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made available 
to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, (Utah 1987), the 
court defined a two step inquiry for reviewing allegations of 
violations of discovery rules: "first, whether the State's 
failure to disclose ... was error, second, if error was 
committed, whether defendant suffered prejudice sufficient to 
warrant reversal." Knight at 916. In approaching the first 
step, this Court should look at "[t]he starting place for 
analyzing the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct... 
defendant's motion to discover." ^d. at 916. In the instant 
case, defendants requested, among other things, written or 
recorded statements of defendants (R. 11, 25). As explained 
above, because the evidence in dispute on appeal was not listed 
in the discovery request, this Court should reject defendants' 
Knight argument at this point (in the event that this Court 
chooses to analyze this point at all beyond noting defendants' 
waiver at trial). For purposes of argument only, the State will 
assume that defendants requested production of oral statements. 
Assuming, arguendo, that defendants had requested the 
production of oral statements, that request would have fallen 
under subsection (5) of Rule 16, which requires either the 
defendant's obtaining a court order for the cooperation of the 
prosecution or voluntary compliance by the prosecution. Inasmuch 
as defendants did not seek a court order for oral statements, it 
is appropriate for this Court to follow the Knight analysis for 
voluntary compliance: 
First, the prosecution either must produce all of the 
material requested or must identify explicitly those 
portions of the request with respect to which no 
responsive material will be provided. Second, when the 
prosecution agrees to produce any of the material 
requested, it must continue to disclose such material 
on an ongoing basis to the defense. 
Id. at 916, 917. 
The prosecutor indicated well in advance of trial that 
he did not view oral statements as included in defendants' 
request for written or recorded statements. The fact that 
defendants were aware of the prosecution's refusal to produce 
oral statements in response to defendants request for written or 
recorded statements is proved by review of the trial transcript, 
in which counsel for defendants demonstrate their understanding 
of the prosecutor's stance before the prosecutor ever articulated 
it at trial: 
THE COURT: Okay. The record should indicate we 
are outside the presence of the Jury. Go ahead. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. As part of our request for 
discovery we had made request for statements made by 
the Defendants. 
MR. OLSEN: That wasn't the request. 
MR. MEANS: I know that there is a slight 
technicality about no recorded statement, and perhaps 
the Police Officer that took the statement didn't 
record it. But I think in fairness to our request, 
where we are asking for statements made by our 
clients, and the response to that request is there are 
none, that I think the State should have come forward 
beforehand to tell us if they had taken statements, if 
they were written, recorded, or just memorized. This 
is the first time I ever heard any indication of a 
statement by my client. 
(T. 15, 16). In later oral arguments, defense counsel again 
indicated his understanding of the prosecution's stance: 
MR. MEANS: Well, Your Honor, nevertheless I'm 
going to object. I know that you understand the 
background on this objection. We had made requests for 
statements made by the Defendant and apparently it was 
made for written or recorded statements. It's 
customary for Police Officers in the enforcement of 
their duties to record statements made by Defendants. 
I think, unfairness [sic] to the Defense, when we've 
asked for statements, whether we've indicated it as 
written or recorded, that they are nevertheless 
statements of Defendants and where we've made that 
request, they should be provided to us and not 
presented to us cold at the trial setting. This is the 
first time that I knew that my client, Mr. Warwick 
here, had made a statement to the officer, or that the 
prosecution intended to use it today. 
(T. 43). Mr. Esplin joined in the objection (T. 44). 
In later argument to the court, Mr. 01sen indicated 
that during a suppression hearing in Sanpete County, that defense 
counsel were made aware of his intent to admissions of 
defendants: 
MR. OLSEN: In addition, at the hearing in Sanpete 
County this same thing came up and I advised both the 
Court and Counsel that there were admissions made to 
the officers, that we relied on. And they asked why 
they hadn't been responded to in their discovery 
proceedings and my specific answer to them was in your 
discovery you asked for written or recorded statements, 
and there weren't any that I was aware of. 
(T. 47). Mr. Olsen also indicated that he could present 
evidence from a sheriff who had told Mr. Means at a preliminary 
hearing, who was representing all three defendants at that time, 
about the statements (T. 94). The court informed Mr. Olsen that 
his ruling excluding the evidence would stand regardless of the 
sheriff's testimony, and told Mr. Olsen that he could make a 
record of the sheriff's testimony later, if he so chose (T. 94). 
During the suppression hearing referred to by Mr. 
Olsen, he indeed told the court and the defendants that the 
defendants had made statements to the arresting officers, but 
that the prosecution had no written or recorded statements of the 
defendants. At that hearing, Sheriff Ekker was testifying, and 
he quoted Mr. Hatch's statement that he didn't know whose cattle 
were in the back of his trailer. At that point, this discussion 
between counsel occurred: 
MR. ESPLIN: I'll object to any statement made by 
the Defendant. We've had response as to a request for 
discovery that no statements were made by them. 
MR. OLSEN: No. Your request was "any written or 
recorded statements." There are statements of the 
Defendants that were made to the officers. And I 
denied there were any others. We don't have any. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
(T. Supp. Hearing 39, transcript of which will hopefully be 
included in the record through this Court's granting a motion for 
supplementation, pertinent pages of which transcript are attached 
as Appendix A). 
Many precedents indicate that it is appropriate for 
this Court, through reviewing the arguments of counsel prior to 
and at trial, to recognize defendants' understanding of the 
prosecution's stance and to recognize that defendants, by failing 
to seek a court order for the production of oral statements, 
destroyed their claim of discovery violation relating to the 
prosecution's non-production of those statements. See State v. 
Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah 1981)(defendant's claim of 
surprise at discrepancy between preliminary hearing testimony and 
trial testimony of witness concerning defendant's statements to 
her was belied by defense counsel's own comments at the beginning 
of the discussion of that testimony during preliminary hearing); 
Gregg v. State, 662 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Okl.Cr. 1983)(defendant's 
claim of non-disclosure of discoverable evidence rejected by 
court because there was evidence that defendant had independent 
knowledge of evidence); Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F.Supp. 945, 
948 (N.D.Okl. 1976)("A prerequisite to relief for non-disclosure 
of required information is that the defense did not have 
independent knowledge of and access to the evidence in 
question."). 
In State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980), the 
defendant argued on appeal that the prosecution violated his 
constitutional rights by failing to produce police reports that 
he claimed were exculpatory. Defendant did not request 
production of the reports prior to or during trial. 
At trial, defendant argued that his victim's ability to 
perceive the events of the crime was impaired by the injury she 
suffered during the crime, while numerous prosecution witnesses 
testified about the victim's lucid perception of the events 
surrounding the crime. Police reports, which were not given to 
defendant prior to trial, apparently indicated that the victim 
was strained, in shock, incoherent, hysterical, and may have 
blacked out for a second. The defendant argued that this 
evidence might have been used by the defendant to show the 
victim's inability to perceive the crime, and to impeach other 
prosecution witnesses. 
The Court refused to allow the defendant to raise this 
argument: 
In any event, we are unwilling to adopt a rule that 
permits defense counsel, by withholding a request for 
available evidence, to in effect corrupt a trial and 
thereby obtain a retrial. In the instant case the 
reports clearly could have been requested. The 
existence of police reports must have been known prior 
to trial and were referred to at the trial. Both 
investigating officers testified, and both expressly 
referred to the reports they had made at the scene of 
the crime. Generally, evidence is not improperly 
withheld if the defense has knowledge of that evidence 
and defense counsel simply fails to request it. 
Id. at 225. 
This Court too, should refuse to accept blindly 
defendants' claims of surprise at evidence and prosecutorial 
violation of discovery rules, when the defendants' own lack of 
diligence during the discovery phase of the trial is the genuine 
cause for the nonproduction of evidence. 
Under Knight, the prosecution's burden under the rules 
of discovery was met prior to trial when the prosecutor indicated 
that he would not voluntarily produce oral statements in response 
to defendants' discovery request. 
Assuming, again strictly for purposes of argument, that 
the oral statements were requested, that the prosecutor complied 
voluntarily with defendants' discovery requests, and that he 
failed to disclose oral statements in violation of the discovery 
rules, this hvDothetie»i ermr t^„i^ 1 * • 
Addressing the second step of the Knight test, 
evaluation of prejudice, the Knight court stated: 
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall 
be disregarded." 
• • • • 
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a 
different outcome must be sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict. ... Applying Rule 
30 to the prosecutor's violations of his discovery 
duties, we must determine whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of [defendant's] 
trial would have been more favorable to him had the 
prosecution revealed the requested material. 
Id. at 919-920. The burden to show harmless error in this 
circumstance falls on the prosecution as soon as the defendant 
can make a "credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have 
impaired the defense". Ici. at 921. 
As was explained in point I of this brief, the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to convict defendants of theft 
of the cattle. The prosecutor's quotation of defendant Warwick 
was never brought into evidence through a witness, and the jurors 
were instructed that the statements of the attorneys were not to 
be considered evidence in the case (R. 138 Ins. 5; opening 
argument of Mr. Esplin, T. 19). See State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 
1106, 1112 (Utah 1985)("Furthermore, in its instructions to the 
jury, the court included the warning that it must not consider as 
evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial."). 
Under Utah law, if a defendant was at trial, as these defendants 
were, aware of the evidence that the prosecution failed to 
"disclose", the nondisclosure of the evidence is harmless error. 
See State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 113 (Utah 1986)("The 
prosecutor's failure to give Slowe written notice of intent to 
use the conviction was clearly error; however, the error was 
harmless. Slowe had actual notice of the prosecutor's intent to 
use the perjury conviction and on a motion in limine, moved to 
suppress it."). This Court should combine these factors with 
defendants' own judgment that the statement now at issue did not 
merit a mistrial or continuance when it first arose, and conclude 
that the prosecutor's quotation of defendant Warwick was, if 
error at all, harmless. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS WAIVED THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT 
TO THE REBUTTAL WITNESS TESTIMONY, WHICH THE 
PROSECUTION WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO PRE-
DISCLOSE. 
Prior to trial, defendants submitted a request for a 
list of prosecution witnesses, to which the prosecution responded 
voluntarily and repeatedly (R. 13, 26). 
During the State's case in chief, the state sought to 
admit testimony from two witnesses reflecting defendants' intent 
to steal the cattle. Sheriff Ekker was going to testify that 
during the arrest, defendant Warwick indicated to him that he 
did not intend to go to trial on the charges for cattle theft 
because he knew he was guilty (T. 50). Officer Brinkerhoff was 
going to testify that defendant Warwick asked him "How did you 
catch us, with the airplane?", and that defendant Olsen said to 
defendant Hatch "I didn't think they'd catch us." (T. 88). This 
was the strongest direct evidence in the State's case of 
defendants' intent to steal the cattle, and it was excluded by 
the trial court. 
After Mr. Hatch testified during the defense's case, 
professing his lack of intent to steal the cattle, the State 
called a rebuttal witness, Donna Young Hatch (T. 168; 176, 177). 
Defense counsel objected to her testimony because she was not 
listed on the witness list during discovery and because she would 
testify to inculpatory statements made by one of the defendants 
(T. 186-187). The prosecutor noted that the court's previous 
ruling barred him from presenting the statements of the 
defendants in the case in chief, but allowed the admission of the 
statements in rebuttal to defendants' testimony at trial (T. 
176). After the prosecution noted that all of the State's 
witnesses for the case in chief had been disclosed, and that this 
witness was not disclosed because the prosecutor didn't know 
whether or not he would need her as a rebuttal witness, the court 
allowed Mrs. Hatch to testify (T. 187). 
During the State's cross-examination of Mr. Hatch, the 
prosecutor asked him if he had made several statements about 
intending to steal cattle in the past, which the state intended 
to show defendant had made to Mrs. Hatch, his ex-wife (T. 175). 
When these statements were addressed in Mrs. Hatch's testimony, 
they were excluded by the court under the authority of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-24-8(1), the marital communications privilege, "The 
Court has examined the statute and the case notes under the 
statute and is of the opinion the objection should be sustained. 
So this witness will not be allowed to testify as to any 
communications that occurred during the course of the marriage or 
afterward, based on the statute." (T. 191). When Mrs. Hatch 
testified that discussions concerning cattle occurred after the 
divorce these statements were excluded, but the basis of the 
exclusion is unintelligible - the basis was either the marital 
communications privilege or failure of the prosecution to list 
Mrs. Hatch as a witness (T. 193). 
Mrs. Hatch's testimony was limited to the statements 
that she and defendant Hatch had discussions concerning the 
taking of cattle (T. 193), and that they had a conversation 
concerning cattle (T. 193). No details were disclosed concerning 
these discussions, other than that they occurred in front of the 
Hatch children and that they occurred after 1984, during the 
months of July, August, September, and October (T. 193). 
A. Defendants Waived Their Opportunity To Raise 
This Objection On Appeal When They Failed To 
Seek A Continuance Or Mistrial At Trial. 
At no time during or after Mrs. Hatch's testimony did 
defendants seek to mitigate the impact of her testimony through a 
motion for a continuance or for a mistrial. Several cases 
demonstrate that defendants' choice at trial to allow this 
"surprise" testimony, without rebuttal, to go with the jurors to 
their deliberations is a choice that binds defendants on appeal. 
See State v. Harris, 14 Wash.App. 414, 542 P.2d 122, 126 
(1975)(remedy for defendant, surprised by rebuttal witness 
testimony, is request for continuance); Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 
503, 513 (Okla. Cr. 1986)(defendant, surprised by witness not 
endorsed on information, must not only object, but must request 
continuance); State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 647 P.2d 734, 739-
740 (1982)(defendant, surprised by rebuttal witness not endorsed 
on information, should have moved for a continuance); People v. 
Renfrow, 193 Colo. 131, 564 P.2d 411, 413 (1977)(defendant waived 
objection to endorsement of witnesses on day of hearing because 
he objected to their testifying, but did not request a 
continuance); Daniels v. State, 558 P.2d 405, 412 (Okl.Cr. 
1976)(remedy for defendant surprised by witness not endorsed on 
information is continuance, and failure to seek one waives 
objection); People v. Bailey, 191 Colo. 366, 552 P.2d 1014, 1017 
(1976)(defense cannot object to late endorsement of witnesses and 
refuse to request continuance); State v. Thomas, 554 P.2d 225, 
226-227 (Utah 1976)(defendant failed to follow statutory mandate 
to request continuance upon prosecution's 'presentation of 
witnesses not indorsed on the information, and thereby waived his 
objection). 
B. The Prosecution Was Under No Duty To List 
Rebuttal Witnesses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4(j) provides that: 
The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment 
or information was based shall be endorsed thereon 
before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not 
affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by 
the court on application of the defendant. Upon 
request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a 
showing of good cause, furnish the names of other 
witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so 
endorsed• 
Several courts have interpreted similar requirements for 
prosecutorial disclosure of prospective witnesses as limited to 
disclosure of case in chief witnesses and excluding rebuttal 
witnesses, because prosecutors are not expected to foresee the 
route taken by the defense and the prosecution rebuttals thereto. 
See McCurry v. State, 538 P.2d 100, 105 (Alaska 1975)("As for 
whether rebuttal witnesses come within the purview of the witness 
list requirement, the general rule seems to be that they do not, 
so long as the rebuttal is true rebuttal and not an attempt to 
present the state's case-in-chief in the rebuttal."); State v. 
Finneqan, 6 Wash.App. 612, 495 P.2d 674, 682 (1972), cert, denied 
Finnegan v. Washington, 410 U.S. 967, (rebuttal witnesses need 
not be listed); State v. Binford, 120 Ariz. 86, 584 P.2d 67, 70 
(1978)(it was not error to allow three unlisted rebuttal 
witnesses to testify after defendant made a last-minute decision 
to testify); State v. Sullivan, 635 P.2d 501, 504-505 (Ariz. 
1981)("However, it is obviously unreasonable to require the State 
to list in advance of trial and prior to the presentation of the 
defendant's case the names of all potential rebuttal witnesses, 
since the prosecution can rarely anticipate what course the 
defense will pursue."); State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 726, 692 P.2d 
370, 383 (1984)(prosecutor's duty to disclose witnesses does not 
extend to rebuttal witnesses); Freeman v. State, 681 P.2d 84, 85 
(Okl.Cr. 1984)("However, the requirement of pretrial notice 
cannot reasonably be applied to rebuttal evidence, since the 
State cannot know with certainty prior to trial what evidence may 
become relevant for rebuttal."). 
In State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 647 P.2d 734 (1982), 
the defendant had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, 
and on appeal he challenged the trial court's admission of 
rebuttal testimony from a witness whose identity and testimony 
were not provided to defendant prior to trial. After the 
prosecution presented its case in chief, the defendant took the 
stand and testified that during the crime, he was intoxicated, 
and did not intend to commit the crime. The prosecution called 
in rebuttal a witness who had not been previously disclosed, to 
testify that the defendant did not seem intoxicated immediately 
after the crime, at which time the defendant had told the witness 
that the defendant had the victim in the sites of his gun when 
the shooting occurred. 
The defendant's claim that this evidence could have 
been admitted during the case in chief, and was therefore 
inadmissible in rebuttal was rejected by the court: 
Rebuttal evidence is evidence which explains, 
repels, counteracts or disproves evidence which has 
been introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party. 
• • . * 
[T]he fact that evidence may be admissible in the case 
in chief does not make it any less rebuttal. The rule 
that the admission, in rebuttal, of evidence admissible 
in the case in chief rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial judge is widely recognized. 
Id. at 737-738 (citations omitted). 
The Olsen court then reviewed the record before them to 
determine whether or not the trial court had abused its 
discretion in allowing the rebuttal witness to testify: 
The defendant alleges that he was deprived of any 
opportunity in which to prepare a cross examination and 
that his expert witness had already been excused. At 
trial, however, he did not seek a continuance to enable 
him to better meet such evidence, nor did he 
specifically claim that he would be prejudiced by the 
admission of the testimony. Finally, the defendant 
waived any surrebuttal which he may have conducted in 
an effort to refute the testimony of Mr. Reeder. Our 
review of the record discloses that defendant had a 
fair opportunity to impeach or contradict Mr. Reeder's 
testimony. 
Id. at 738. In the instant case, defendants were put on notice 
of the expected content of Mrs. Hatch's testimony during Mr. 
Olsen's cross-examination of defendant Hatch (T. 176), and yet 
they never presented any surrebuttal, sought a continuance, or 
requested a mistrial. 
Mrs. Hatch's testimony was properly presented in 
rebuttal. Other direct evidence of defendants' intent which the 
state sought to introduce during the case in chief was of higher 
quality than that provided by Mrs. Hatch. Defendants' statements 
to Sheriff Ekker and Officer Brinkerhoff were obviously much 
closer in time and physical proximity to the crime at issue than 
were the statements made to Mrs. Hatch. The conversations 
between the Hatches had no bearing on the intent of defendants 
Warwick and Olsen. While the relationship of Mrs. Hatch and 
defendant Hatch (parents of Hatch children) might have caused 
Mrs. Hatch to feel some trepidation at the prospect of 
testifying, Sheriff Ekker and Officer Brinkerhoff apparently had 
no such relationships with any of the defendants that might cause 
the prosecution to avoid the use of their testimony. 
Particularly in light of the trial court's ruling forbidding any 
testimony concerning defendants' statements prior to their 
testifying at trial, and in light of the fact that defendant 
Hatch was the only defendant who testified, the prosecutor's 
choice to use Mrs. Hatch's testimony in rebuttal was appropriate. 
As did the Olsen court, this Court should determine 
that the prosecution had no duty to foresee and disclose their 
need for Mrs. Hatch's testimony, and that defendants had a fair 
opportunity to rebut this evidence, which they waived. 
C. If It Was Error For The Trial Court To Allow 
Mrs. Hatch To Testify, It Was Harmless Error. 
In State v. Wight, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. 
1988), this Court explained that "[e]rror is reversible 'only if 
a review of the record persuades the court that without the error 
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
the defendant.'" Id. at 32 (citations omitted). 
Other Utah case law demonstrates that the presentation 
of evidence which was not disclosed to the defense prior to trial 
is considered harmless if other equally inculpatory evidence is 
legitimately admitted at trial. In State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 
(Utah 1985), the prosecution's failure to disclose a witness 
after voluntary compliance with request for witness list did not 
justify a mistrial because the witness only testified that he had 
seen the defendant in proximity to the scene of crime after it 
was committed, and because other substantial evidence showed the 
defendant's guilt. See also State v. Ott, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 
39-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(this Court assumed, but did not 
decide, that evidence should have been suppressed, but then found 
that the admission was harmless error, because the facts proved 
by that evidence were proved by evidence properly admitted). 
As was demonstrated in Point I, the evidence of 
defendants' guilt was strong in this case, independent of the 
testimony of Mrs. Hatch (Mrs. Hatch's contribution to the 
evidence presented in Point I was the fact that defendant Hatch 
had researched and was interested in obtaining Longhorns). 
POINT IV 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON TRANSPORTING CATTLE 
WITHOUT A BRAND IS MOOT AT THIS POINT AND WAS 
PROPERLY GIVEN AT TRIAL. 
The transportation of unbranded cattle instruction was 
phrased as a lesser included offense instruction at the request 
of the defense (T. 208-209). The defendants repeatedly raised 
the issue of the illegality of failing to brand cattle, 
apparently to impress the jurors with the idea that if a cattle 
owner illegally fails to brand his cattle, anyone who knows the 
law of branding is entitled to take the unbranded cattle (T. 116-
118, 128; R. 100, 101, 107, 108). It was apparently to 
demonstrate that the law governing cattle stewardship does not 
condone taking unbranded cattle that the trial court insisted on 
including reference to the law which forbids transporting cattle 
without proof of ownership (R. 206-207). After the court refused 
to withdraw the instruction, defense counsel requested that the 
transportation crime be instructed upon as though it were a 
lesser included offense of theft, and the court allowed them to 
draft the instruction as they wished (T. 208, 209). That 
instruction read: 
There is a lesser included offense within the 
crime of theft of cattle as charged which provides that 
no person may transport cattle without having an 
official State brand certificate or other proof of 
ownership in his possession. 
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant or either of them transported livestock 
without a transit permit signed by an owner or his 
representative specifying the date of transportation, 
place of origin, or loading, destination, date of 
issuance and number of head being transported, but did 
not intend to deprive the owner thereof, you may find 
said defendant Guilty of the lesser included offense of 
transporting without a permit. 
(R. 141). 
A. The Instruction Issue Is Moot Because Defendants 
Were Convicted Of The Offense Of Theft. 
"[T]he general rule [is] that under ordinary factual 
situations where a jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater 
offense, the giving of an erroneous instruction on a lesser 
offense is not deemed prejudicial." State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 
54, 13 P.2d 422, 424 (1973). 
In State v. Hall, 712 P.2d 229 (Utah 1985), the 
defendant challenged the trial court's giving of a lesser 
included offense instruction, but the court refused to address it 
because the jury's conviction of greater offense, following their 
having been instructed on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard of proof, obviated need for judicial examination of 
lesser included offense instruction. 
The Hall and Valdez cases demonstrate that the question 
of whether or not the trial court's giving the jurors the 
instruction on transporting cattle was error, is moot because 
defendants' jurors were instructed properly on the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard of proof (R. 142), and convicted 
defendants of the "greater" offense in this case (R. 164-166). 
B. The Instruction On Transporting Cattle Was 
Properly Given. 
The standards for evaluating claims of improper jury 
instructions are set out in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 
1981): 
[T]he law in Utah is that jury instructions are to be 
considered as a whole... When taken as a whole if they 
fairly tender the case to the jury, the fact that one 
or more of the instructions, standing alone, are not as 
full or accurate as they might have been is not 
reversible error. 
Id. at 542 (citations omitted). Similarly, in State v. Anselmo, 
558 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977), the court explained, 
Ordinarily it is error to instruct on abstract 
principles of law that are not applicable to the facts 
before the jury, and we think it was improper to 
include subsection (3) in the instruction given in 
this case. However, since there was absolutely no way 
the jury could have related the instruction to the 
verdict, it was harmless error. 
£d. at 1327. 
Applying these rules to the instructions given in this 
case, this Court should find that, regardless of instruction 9A, 
the jurors in this case were properly instructed. The 
instructions given instruct the jurors correctly upon the law 
applicable to the case, and the instruction objected to by 
defendants on appeal explains that as a lesser included offense, 
the crime of transporting cattle without proof of ownership is 
relevant only when the jurors are unable to find that the 
defendants possessed the requisite mental state for theft. Given 
the language of the instruction to which defendants object, and 
the quality of the instructions as a whole, defendants' 
contention that instruction 9A influenced the jurors to convict 
defendants of theft is implausible, and should be rejected. 
POINT V 
THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING COMMENTS WERE 
PROPER. 
The Utah Supreme Court has promulgated a two-part test 
for reviewing a prosecutor's comments to the jury 
(1) did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they could not properly consider in 
determining their verdict, and (2) were the jurors 
under the circumstances of the particular case probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187 (Utah 1986)- The application 
of this test is "within the sound discretion of the trial court 
on motion for a new trial. If there be no abuse of this 
discretion and substantial justice appears to have been done, the 
appellate court will not reverse the judgment." State v. Valdez, 
30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973). 
In the arguments to the trial court, defendants based 
their objection to the testimony on the prosecution's failure to 
"disclose" the evidence, and under the authority of Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). As was discussed in point 
II, defendants waived these arguments at trial. As was also 
discussed above, the argument is meritless because the oral 
statements at issue here were not requested by the defendants. 
The prosecutor followed the rules of discovery, while the 
defendants, in contrast, although aware of the prosecution's 
refusal to provide oral statements in response to defendants' 
request for written and recorded statements, neglected pretrial 
and trial remedies under the discovery rules (discovery request 
for oral statements, motion for court order for oral statements, 
motion for continuance or mistrial). 
Particularly under the facts of this case (intent was 
the only issue in dispute; defendant Hatch testified as to his 
innocent intent), defendant Warwick's statement "We are not going 
through all that rigmarole ....I'm guilty and I know it." (T. 15) 
is not a confession that demonstrates his codefendants' guilt. 
Thus# the statement was not necessarily excluded by Bruton. See 
Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed2d 176 
(1987)("In Bruton, the codefendant's confession "expressly 
implicated]M the defendant as his accomplice. Thus, at the time 
that confession was introduced there was not the slightest doubt 
that it would prove "powerfully incriminating." By contrast, in 
this case the confession was not incriminating on its face, and 
became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at 
trial."); State v. Ellis v. Withers, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 
1987)(To invoke the Bruton doctrine, a statement must be 
powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the other 
defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate 
the complaining defendant in the commission of the crime."). 
Under these circumstances, the statement quoted by the 
prosecutor was a "matter ... which the jurors could ... properly 
consider" as evidence of defendants' intent to steal the cattle. 
See State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 457 (Utah 1986)(Prosecutor's 
attempt to elicit testimony concerning codefendants' statements 
to each other immediately prior to murder was proper effort to 
demonstrate defendants' intent.). 
Particularly in light of the evidence of defendants' 
guilt, this Court should not conclude that the prosecutor's 
comment prejudiced defendants. See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 
486-487 (Utah 1984)(explaining that the weight this Court gives 
to an argument of improper prosecutorial comment should be 
inversely proportionate to the weight of the evidence against 
defendants); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 62 (Utah 
1982)("There is reversible error only if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that an improper question by the prosecutor so 
prejudiced the jury that in its absence there might have been a 
different result."). 
The cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable 
from the present one. See State v. West, 617 P.2d 1298 (Mon. 
1980)(prosecutor, in violation of explicit court order, quoted 
inadmissible hearsay evidence during his opening argument, and 
defendant moved for a mistrial); State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 
(Utah 1981)(prosecutor five times called attention to defendant's 
failure to testify, and defendant objected each time and moved 
for a mistrial). 
As was noted above in point II, defendants did not seek 
any remedies other than exclusion of the evidence referred to by 
the prosecutor when the prosecutor made the statement at issue 
here. The fact that defendants have rephrased their "violation 
of discovery rules" argument into a "prosecutorial misconduct" 
argument does not change the fact that defendants waived this 
objection at trial. In disposing of this issue, this Court 
should refer to State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), where 
the Utah Supreme Court explained the relevance to an appeal based 
on improper prosecutorial comment of a defendant's procedural 
conduct following allegedly improper comment by the prosecution: 
Furthermore, in its instructions to the jury, the court 
included the warning that it must not consider as 
evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial 
and that "[t]he law forbids you to be governed by mere 
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, 
public opinion or public feeling." ... this 
instruction, without more, clearly would have been 
inadequate to cure the defect caused by the 
prosecutor's improper remarks. However, consideration 
of all the circumstances of this case, including the 
nature and extent of the evidence discussed above leads 
us to conclude that the jurors were not "probably 
influenced by [the] remarks". Additionally, we also 
note that the defense did not make any objection to the 
prosecutor's remarks at the time they were made, nor 
was a special cautionary instruction requested which 
could have undone any harm or corrected any 
misapprehensions on the part of the jurors 
immediately. Likewise, the matter does not appear to 
have been called to the trial judge's attention by 
means of a request for a mistrial or a new trial, 
which suggests that defendant's concerns about 
improper influence have arisen in the course of the 
preparation of this appeal, rather than from 
perceptions at the time of trial. It is therefore our 
opinion that reversal is not warranted. 
Id. at 1112-1113 (emphasis added). See also State v. Lairby, 699 
P.2d 1187, 1198 (Utah 1984)(defendants' stipulation to joint 
trial waived due process objections related to joinder), 
overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 
628, 631, (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants waived at trial the issues of nonproduction 
of oral statements and failure to list Mrs. Hatch as a witness, 
and thus, this Court need not reach the merits of points I, II 
and IV of the Appellants' Brief. 
In the event that this Court chooses to address the 
nonproduction issues, defendants' points I and IV should be 
rejected because the nonproduction resulted from defense failure 
to request oral statements, and from defense failure to pursue 
production of the oral statements once they knew that the 
prosecution would not produce oral statements in response to a 
request for written or recorded statements. Because the 
prosecution's nonproduction of the oral statements was 
legitimate, the evidence quoted by the prosecutor but not 
presented to the jurors could properly have come before the 
jurors, and defendants' points I and IV are meritless. 
If point II is addressed on the merits, it should be 
rejected because the prosecution was under no duty to disclose 
this rebuttal witness, because her testimony was properly 
admitted, and because other evidence of defendants' guilt renders 
any possible error harmless. 
The propriety of the trial court's giving a jury 
instruction drafted by defendants at their request as a lesser 
included offense of theft instruction is moot because the jurors 
found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft. If 
this Court chooses to address defendants' point III, it too 
should be rejected because the instruction was appropriate in the 
context of this case and because the instructions as a whole 
properly instructed the jurors, and no prejudicial error occurred 
as a result of instruction 9A. 
A review of the evidence presented through defendant 
Hatch and the other witnesses, and consideration of inferences 
that might be drawn from that evidence demonstrate that 
defendants' jurors were acting within reason in convicting 
defendants of theft. 
Defendants' convictions should be affirmed. 
DATED this Q day of February, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
»IW -^ElLlaABETH, HDLBROOK 
Assistants Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Michael D. Esplin, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "LM, Provo, Utah 
84603-0200, and Thomas H. Means, 81 East Center, Provo, Utah 
84601, attorneys for appellants, this _/ day of February, 1989. 
i \ 
APPENDIX 


























A Y p r t , T d i d . T t ( J H V P mp * b p t t p r v i p w o f t h p 
O ^ t t l P . 
Q And wprp you ^hlp to m^fcp ^ny rpnognition of thp 
OHttlP? 
A T oould idpntify thp cat tip by thpir oolor. Thprp 
w^& a oouplp of thfjftp th^t W P T P oolorpd, nnd with thp hornpd 
o^ttlp thr*t wprp d i «3t i not i V P 1 v lonohurn r.ros^ with hprpford. 
0 And with your b«4ofcground thnt indio«=itPd to you 
Wh.Ht? 
A T h n t i n d i o ^ t p d t o mp t h n t t h p y w p r p i ^ t t l n r » i f t p d 
by A. C. F l rUp r . 
0 Thpn w h n t d i d v o n do n f t p r m^k inc i H I P H P 
o h s p r v n t i cms? 
A T p r p p n r p d f o r my s t n n . 
Q A n d h o w d i d y r J u d o t h M t ? 
A T blookpd thp rciHil with my vphiolp, turning thp rpd 
light—*idp moutitpd rpd light — i n t hp direction of thp 
oncoming vphiolp. 
Q Ar»d wh^t npxt ooourrpd? 
A Whpn t h p v p h i o l p n p p r o r i o h p d , T ^ p p r o n o h ^ d t h p 
v p h i o l p . Whpn i t ftppn my v p h i o l p i t i m m p d i « s t p l y t r t pd t o 
s t o p . T t Wrjft s t o p p i n g n o t i n t h p l o c a t i o n t h ^ t T f p l t h p f t t , 
s ^ f p w i t h f o r *n 1 1 o o n o o r n p d . T l i nd t o movp t h p v p h i o l p up H 
l i t t l p o l o r ^ p r Hurl rthut t h p v p h i o l p o f f . T r*&kpd t h n d r i v p r , 
w h i o h WHA i t t u r t i p d o u t t o VJP M r . H n t o h , "Whoftp o n t t l p n r p 
PAHR 30 
1 thpsft?" 
2 MR. RSPF.TN? T • 1 1 objpof to nny atatpmNnt mndM by 
3 II thp D p f p n d n n t . W P ' V P had rpsponsp H S to A rpqupst for 
4 disoovpry that no stntpmpnts wprp mndp by thpm. 
5 MR. OT.SRN: No. Your rnqupst W H S Mnny written or 
6 rpoordpd stn tpmpn ts. " Thprp nrp stntpmpnts of thp Dpfpndnnts 
7 thnt wprp mndp to thp o f f i o p r s . And T dpnipd thprp wprp /my 
8 otliHr'H. W P don't IIHVP nny. 
9 T H E C O U R T - T h p o b j p o t i o n i s o v p r r u l p d . 
10 W T T N R S S ? A M r . H * t o h r p p l i P d , " T d o n ' t 
11 k n o w . " T r p p l i p d , " T h p b p 11 y o u d o n ' t k n o w . " T h a t W H S my 
12 P X H O t w o r d s . 
13 T M i n n r p i n o v p d t h p s n s n H C : t s f r o m t h p v p h i o l p , 
14 s p o u r p d t h p s i i s n p c t s . r p m o v p d t h p i r U H r s o t i d l h p l o n o i n o s . F.H<:h ij * * * «* w 
15 o f t h p i r p p r s r i r i n l h p l o n g i n g s W H S p l a o p d i n b a r k , d o o n m p n t p d 
16 r i n d t n g r j p d t o t t ip i r o w n p r s h i p . A n d thn p n d o f t h p s t o r y , . A l 
17 w p n t w i t h t l i H i n t o fipvinr C o u n t y , T H i 1 . 
18 Q Mow n t t h i s p H r t i o u l n r t i tun t i i n h . / m d H S p a r t o f 
19 t h i:} a r r p s t , d i d y o u p i c k u p t h p C o n t r a b a n d o r t i n * s t J J I P M 
20 r . r f t t 1 P ? 
21 A V P S , T d i d . R u t T t h i n k s o m p t h i n g t h n f n p p d s t o h p 
22 H s t d b l i s h n t l h p r p i s t h i s t r a i 1 p r i s n o t a n p n o l o s p d t rvi i U> r t o 
23 v i p w . T h i s t r a i l p r i s o p p n t o u i P W a t n i l t i H I P S nru] T t h. i n k 
24 t h a t t h n t n p p d s t o h p P f t t n h l I s h n t l h n r p t l i n t T d i d n ' t h n W p t o 
25 P^nk in nt a oprtain ang 1 P to S P P it. Tt's oppn. 
